Sort Kashmir - Cut defence spending
by M B Naqvi
President Pervez Musharraf in his interview to NDTV on December 5 has given the ultimate concession to India. It is a clean break from Pakistan's 59-year-old stand. True, Pakistan withdrawing the UN-supervised plebiscite demand is conditional on India showing flexibility and as such is tentative: for the sake of further the argument. But once the president says he can resile from the old stance, any prospect of a plebiscite ever happening has disappeared. What is implied has, however, the merit of being realistic -- peacemaking with India, on largely the basis of what the Indians insist on, is unavoidable.
The Indians insist that Kashmir has acceded to India and that is that. The rest of the world has to live with the reality of Kashmir Valley being an integral part of India. Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh used the deft formulation: let's make the borders irrelevant; they will be there alright but would not matter in the daily lives of the Kashmiri citizens of the two countries. To make this proposal more acceptable, Dr Singh has thrown in a yet-to-be-negotiated quantum of autonomy for the two Kashmirs, Indian and Pakistani (AJK). Pakistan has tentatively accepted this Indian idea and has itself developed the Indians' concept.
There are four aspects of Musharraf's Kashmir proposals. One is of course autonomy for the two Kashmirs. The second is the attempt to make the border soft -- "irrelevant" -- by allowing the Kashmiris on both sides of the LOC to cross it more easily and to conduct trade across it. How free that trade is has to be worked out. The third element is thinning out of the troops on both sides, although Musharraf's use of the term de-militarisation is unlikely to be acceptable to the Indian security establishment -- true strength of which is now becoming clear. Finally, there has to be a joint mechanism between the two countries to manage the all-Kashmir problems that concern both parts or arise from time to time.
President Musharraf has thus notionally recognised India's sovereignty over the parts of Kashmir it is occupying. That has a ring of finality about it. It is no use Pakistan Foreign Office saying that policy has not changed. It is a theoretical proposition. For the rest of the world Pakistan has resiled from the old demand and is now open to other ideas.
There are also some obscurities: why is Musharraf in such a terrible hurry? But he is a soldier and should be credited with knowing his trade. New ideas pre-empt the threat of war: He and his ministers proclaim that no stable peace can come to South Asia without a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir problem. This implies that if the Indians do not accept Pakistan's pleas, there is bound to be a war; stable peace is contingent on the desired settlement. It involves a threat from Pakistan's side.
Now that India has been brought to the negotiating table -- two rounds of negotiations having failed, a third, or is it fourth, may soon progress --President Musharraf's initial indication is that the likely Kashmir settlement is to be basically on India's terms. This arrangement could have been arrived at five, 10 or 15 years ago. The reasons why Musharraf now proposes to recognise India's sovereignty over Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Ladakh are based on hard realism, though that is something painful for patriots to admit.
A war with India is now out of the question. Pakistan's minimum nuclear deterrent and the conventional arms preparedness together do not make war with India a practical proposal. The experience of the 2002 crisis, with the armies of the two countries eyeball t eyeball, showed that a nuclear war between these two neighbours is no longer possible for either side. Note that India had credibly threatened to invade Pakistan knowing that Pakistan was a nuclear power; George Fernandes had threatened that India can absorb Pakistan's first strike but would retaliate massively and destroy its seven or eight industrial-military centres.
There was obvious truth in it. This means that India's larger deterrent has more deterring power than Pakistan's smaller one. Therefore, Pakistan cannot take the initiative to start another war and whichever way another war starts, it will not be to Pakistan's advantage. That changes the whole complexion of the Kashmir dispute: now no solution can be predicated on military force. Musharraf knows it and good that he is proceeding on this basis.
This will certainly cause much argumentation. This should have been known earlier. After spending so much and after so much human effort, we are faced with simple facts: India is a larger country with a larger deterrent; it is more developed; it is richer and more influential in the world. Pakistan went to war so many times but only to force India to the negotiating table -- a silly proposition. If you cannot solve a problem through war, how diplomacy after an inconclusive war can get you Kashmir? Why were the wars inconclusive? Because of Pakistan being poorer and weaker. Didn't Pakistani generals know this? Why did poor Pakistanis have to pay for a huge military establishment that has usurped people's political rights, subverted politics and foisted the army's unending domination over the whole polity.
Well, what has happened has happened. It cannot be undone. We had better do some course correction now. That poses an urgent question before Pakistanis. We have a large paraphernalia of military preparedness, nuclear deterrent, complete with missiles. What to do with it? It is costly to maintain. Our economy could never sustain it without foreign aid. Musharraf has himself said that Pakistan faces no existential external threat; only internal threats need attention. Why not reduce expenditure on the military and give people a peace dividend. Let this be an issue of the 2007 elections.
Also up for discussion is the question of what kind of development we need. Considerable disarmament and demilitarisation is needed for the economy itself. Its main paradigm must be to ensure all the democratic rights, including jobs for the maximum number of people and social security for those who cannot be provided with jobs. The paradigm actually followed in recent years has increased disparities of income both vertically and horizontally. We need a more pro-poor development paradigm. Social equity is an integral part of political freedom. Let's follow this paradigm.
(Published earlier in The News, 20 december 2006)
President Pervez Musharraf in his interview to NDTV on December 5 has given the ultimate concession to India. It is a clean break from Pakistan's 59-year-old stand. True, Pakistan withdrawing the UN-supervised plebiscite demand is conditional on India showing flexibility and as such is tentative: for the sake of further the argument. But once the president says he can resile from the old stance, any prospect of a plebiscite ever happening has disappeared. What is implied has, however, the merit of being realistic -- peacemaking with India, on largely the basis of what the Indians insist on, is unavoidable.
The Indians insist that Kashmir has acceded to India and that is that. The rest of the world has to live with the reality of Kashmir Valley being an integral part of India. Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh used the deft formulation: let's make the borders irrelevant; they will be there alright but would not matter in the daily lives of the Kashmiri citizens of the two countries. To make this proposal more acceptable, Dr Singh has thrown in a yet-to-be-negotiated quantum of autonomy for the two Kashmirs, Indian and Pakistani (AJK). Pakistan has tentatively accepted this Indian idea and has itself developed the Indians' concept.
There are four aspects of Musharraf's Kashmir proposals. One is of course autonomy for the two Kashmirs. The second is the attempt to make the border soft -- "irrelevant" -- by allowing the Kashmiris on both sides of the LOC to cross it more easily and to conduct trade across it. How free that trade is has to be worked out. The third element is thinning out of the troops on both sides, although Musharraf's use of the term de-militarisation is unlikely to be acceptable to the Indian security establishment -- true strength of which is now becoming clear. Finally, there has to be a joint mechanism between the two countries to manage the all-Kashmir problems that concern both parts or arise from time to time.
President Musharraf has thus notionally recognised India's sovereignty over the parts of Kashmir it is occupying. That has a ring of finality about it. It is no use Pakistan Foreign Office saying that policy has not changed. It is a theoretical proposition. For the rest of the world Pakistan has resiled from the old demand and is now open to other ideas.
There are also some obscurities: why is Musharraf in such a terrible hurry? But he is a soldier and should be credited with knowing his trade. New ideas pre-empt the threat of war: He and his ministers proclaim that no stable peace can come to South Asia without a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir problem. This implies that if the Indians do not accept Pakistan's pleas, there is bound to be a war; stable peace is contingent on the desired settlement. It involves a threat from Pakistan's side.
Now that India has been brought to the negotiating table -- two rounds of negotiations having failed, a third, or is it fourth, may soon progress --President Musharraf's initial indication is that the likely Kashmir settlement is to be basically on India's terms. This arrangement could have been arrived at five, 10 or 15 years ago. The reasons why Musharraf now proposes to recognise India's sovereignty over Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Ladakh are based on hard realism, though that is something painful for patriots to admit.
A war with India is now out of the question. Pakistan's minimum nuclear deterrent and the conventional arms preparedness together do not make war with India a practical proposal. The experience of the 2002 crisis, with the armies of the two countries eyeball t eyeball, showed that a nuclear war between these two neighbours is no longer possible for either side. Note that India had credibly threatened to invade Pakistan knowing that Pakistan was a nuclear power; George Fernandes had threatened that India can absorb Pakistan's first strike but would retaliate massively and destroy its seven or eight industrial-military centres.
There was obvious truth in it. This means that India's larger deterrent has more deterring power than Pakistan's smaller one. Therefore, Pakistan cannot take the initiative to start another war and whichever way another war starts, it will not be to Pakistan's advantage. That changes the whole complexion of the Kashmir dispute: now no solution can be predicated on military force. Musharraf knows it and good that he is proceeding on this basis.
This will certainly cause much argumentation. This should have been known earlier. After spending so much and after so much human effort, we are faced with simple facts: India is a larger country with a larger deterrent; it is more developed; it is richer and more influential in the world. Pakistan went to war so many times but only to force India to the negotiating table -- a silly proposition. If you cannot solve a problem through war, how diplomacy after an inconclusive war can get you Kashmir? Why were the wars inconclusive? Because of Pakistan being poorer and weaker. Didn't Pakistani generals know this? Why did poor Pakistanis have to pay for a huge military establishment that has usurped people's political rights, subverted politics and foisted the army's unending domination over the whole polity.
Well, what has happened has happened. It cannot be undone. We had better do some course correction now. That poses an urgent question before Pakistanis. We have a large paraphernalia of military preparedness, nuclear deterrent, complete with missiles. What to do with it? It is costly to maintain. Our economy could never sustain it without foreign aid. Musharraf has himself said that Pakistan faces no existential external threat; only internal threats need attention. Why not reduce expenditure on the military and give people a peace dividend. Let this be an issue of the 2007 elections.
Also up for discussion is the question of what kind of development we need. Considerable disarmament and demilitarisation is needed for the economy itself. Its main paradigm must be to ensure all the democratic rights, including jobs for the maximum number of people and social security for those who cannot be provided with jobs. The paradigm actually followed in recent years has increased disparities of income both vertically and horizontally. We need a more pro-poor development paradigm. Social equity is an integral part of political freedom. Let's follow this paradigm.
(Published earlier in The News, 20 december 2006)