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Abolition of nuclear weapons and the Indo US Nuclear Deal

[The following is the text of the speech delivered by the Sukla Sen as the representative of the people’s movements in India against nuclear weapons during a panel discussion on the above theme held in Japan. The other members of the panel were the representatives of the governments of Mexico and Egypt; Arab League and the General Secretary of the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo) - the host.]

o o o

International Forum
2006 World Conference against A & H Bombs - Nagasaki
Nakabe Auditorium, August 8, 2006


Sukla Sen
Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace
India

Respected Members of the Chair, Other Distinguished
Dignitaries on the Panel and Dear Friends and
Comrades,

I now propose to make only a brief initial presentation on the theme of quick abolition of nuclear weapons from a specific angle which I’ll elaborate as I go along. The essential points made now will be enlarged upon later during the interactive session.
My presentation will have three sections: first, I’ll very briefly touch upon the uniqueness of nuclear weapons as an instrument of deliberate and indiscriminate mass murder on a mind boggling scale; then I’ll try to present a bird’s eye view of the developments on the nuclear front in the global arena during the last decade; and finally, as the representative of the anti-nuke peace movement in India, I’ll deliberate the Indo-US nuke ‘deal’, which, if eventually implemented, will have a serious bearing on the course of events in the coming days.

As regards the question why it is at all necessary to work wholeheartedly and with single-minded determination towards quick abolition of the nuclear weapon, we have to investigate and underscore its uniqueness as a weapon of deliberate mass murder.
The nuclear weapon is unique just not in terms of its instant destructive effects caused by terrible blast and heat - way beyond the limits of conventional explosives, but it’s also unique as it keeps on killing and maiming silently and invisibly through nuclear radiation emitted for decades and decades punishing cruelly even unborn generations, and at times, in faraway lands beyond national boundaries. Not only the hapless targets of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, but also the unintended victims of the Chernobyl disaster twenty years back - mostly in Belarus and Ukraine but also elsewhere in Europe in this regard provide the most tragic and graphic evidences. It is precisely this that makes the weapon a unique and absolute evil regardless of the holder.

Now I come to the second part.

Just over a decade back, in 1995, the NPT was indefinitely extended without any concrete commitment from the five recognised Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) as regards a time-bound disarmament programme. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that, however, came up in the process as a sort of inadequate but nevertheless a positive move towards global disarmament most unfortunately failed to be born in any meaningful sense. The major impediments were firstly Indian intransigence and subsequently the refusal of the US Senate to grant the mandatory ratification. This development had a profoundly negative impact and seriously undermined the mood of tentative optimism that had been generated in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The 2000 NPT Review Conference was, however, a modest success. The NWSs renewed their commitment to nuclear disarmament and, even more importantly, thirteen practical steps were laid out to commence a purposeful journey in that direction. The change in regime in the US soon after with George Bush grabbing the Presidential throne in January 2001 however changed all that. It inaugurated an almost uninterrupted journey downhill. Since then gross and brazen unilateralism has emerged as the most significant marker of the policies of the Bush regime propelled by its relentless drive for unfettered global dominance nicknamed as the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Towards this goal the regime has unashamedly foregrounded its awesome military might, including the nuclear firepower, to make up for the deficiencies of its otherwise huge economic muscles and political/diplomatic clout. It soon reactivated its nuclear arsenal development programme including tactical and earth-penetrating nukes and launched the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Programme unilaterally scrapping the 1972 ABM Treaty. But the most significant development was unarguably its savage War on Iraq launched in March 2003 to gain control over its oil and in turn the lifeline of the global economy. Under the circumstances it is no wonder that the 2005 NPT Review Conference ended in a stalemate. The positive hopes generated by the previous Conference were all but lost. The ongoing highpitched campaigns of the US, together with its allies, to cap the nuclear capabilities of Iran and North Korea have emerged as two major recent flashpoints. Moreover, tensions and conflicts are at the moment indeed boiling over in West Asia. This has all the potentialities of turning into a full-scale nuclear holocaust.

Now I take up the third and last part.

The proposed Indo-US nuke deal, the first outlines of which were given out on July 18 last year, is yet another profoundly negative development in the making demanding all our immediate attention. This has to be viewed in the context of the utterly disturbing global scenario, as we’ve just discussed in brief, and the overt nuclearisation of South Asia in May 1998.

This would-be ‘deal’, which has already crossed a number of milestones, would enable India - a non-signatory to the NPT - as are Pakistan and Israel, in gross contravention of its underlying principles and the current norms of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG), to have civilian nuclear trade with the US and also the rest of the world. In return India is to designate and separate its civilian and ‘strategic’ nuclear power plants and negotiate with the IAEA the special and specific terms of its inspections of the plants designated ‘civilian’ by India at its own option. The nuclear trade - understandably consisting of fuel, plants, spares, technologies etc., would, however, be restricted to the plants under IAEA inspection only.

This ongoing act of unique exceptionalism is a severe frontal assault on whatever credibility of the NPT - the only multilateral commitment, however vague, of the five NWSs to global nuclear disarmament. The virtual legitimisation of India’s nuclear status, as and when the ‘deal’ comes through would deal a severe blow to the prospects of nuclear non-proliferation and thereby disarmament. Further cementing of the strategic ties between the US and India, as its junior regional ally, through this ‘deal’ would provide an added fillip to the aggressive ambitions of the Bush administration. This asymmetric ‘favour’ to India would also go to further aggravate the simmering tensions and spiralling arms race in South Asia.

This would also distort India’s energy options by diverting scarce resources to developments of resource-guzzling, intrinsically hazardous and potentially catastrophic, nuclear power at the cost of ecologically benign renewable sources of energy.
The ‘deal’ mercifully, however, calls for the US Congressional assent, as it’d impact the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 1978, and primarily the US Atomic Energy Act, 1954. Two Congressional committees, from both the houses, have already given green signals to the Bill proposed by the Bush administration in this regard albeit with a few (thorny) riders. Subsequently the House of Representatives has passed the ‘US India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006’. In the process, however, the assent has become a two-stage affair instead of one, that too in advance, as originally envisaged. So, while even the ongoing first stage remains to be completed with the approval by the Senate still pending; when the full details of the separation plan and nuclear cooperation are worked out between India and the Bush administration, the terms of inspections by the IAEA are finalised and, most significantly, the NSG discusses and (consensually) clears the ‘deal’, the ‘deal’ would again go back to the Congress for its final nod.

The Indian peace movement as spearheaded by the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) is seriously engaged with raising public awareness and mobilising opinion against the ‘deal’. This, we must keep in mind, is very different from the Rightwing and hawkish opposition on the false pretext that the ‘deal’ would delimit India’s capacity to produce as many Bombs as it likes. In fact the ‘deal’ would do just the opposite by allowing India to use its indigenously mined uranium exclusively for Bomb production. The ‘deal’, in any case, doesn’t call for any parliamentary ratification in India.

Under the circumstances, while it’s extremely important to carry out vigorous campaigns against this pernicious move all over the world including India and, more importantly, the US; there is an urgent need to focus our attention on the NSG members who’re not too enamoured by the commercial prospects of the ‘deal’. We must do whatever we can to encourage and further strengthen the contrarian voices. The members of the NAM and the erstwhile New Agenda Coalition in the NSG deserve our special attention. So do Norway and a few other members.

It is extremely important for the global peace movement to take due note of the severely damaging fallout of this dangerous ‘deal’ and spare no efforts, both conventional and creative, to stop it in its track.

Thank you.
Related Entries:
India: Statement of Students Against Nuclear Power
Resolution adopted at the seminar Indo US Nuclear ‘Deal’ India, South Asia, NAM and the Global Order
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Towards a Nuclear Free South Asia

TOWARDS A NUCLEAR-FREE SOUTH ASIA
by M.B. Naqvi

Exactly sixty-one years ago the US inaugurated the nuclear age by dropping a nuclear bomb on Nagasaki. The evil nature of the bomb is obvious. It is a weapon against which there is no defence and it does not distinguish between combatants and civilians; and kills all indiscriminately; men, women and children.

Atomic weapons did not remain a US monopoly for long. The Soviets, British and French quickly acquired them. By 1960s the Israelis had made their own atomic weapons, helped by France, Britain, the US and South Africa. China entered this exclusive club in 1964. Ten years later India blasted its way into it. Pakistan felt compelled to go nuclear in 1972 after India had defeated and dismembered it. The rumours of Islamabad trying to go nuclear may have moved the Indians to explode a bomb in 1974; maybe to forestall Pakistan. Pakistan acquired the know-how in 1984 and a device by 1986. Many nations may be trying to acquire nuclear capability. And the US is accusing Iran. North Korea is the latest member of the club.

One's compelling concern is about the nuclearisation of South Asia. Islamabad freely acknowledges its nuclear weapons are to deter India that is perceived as a permanent existential threat. As for India, it has grand ideas of a great power status with a military capability to match it. In 1998, India reminded the world of its nuclear status. Pakistan felt constrained to go one better by blasting six nuclear devices against India's five. There has been no moment of tranquillity since. Instead an armed truce in which the arms race in nuclear, missiles and conventional weapons spheres has escalated. South Asia's emotional volatility may make this area see nuclear weapons being used again.

Pakistan's propaganda and existence of its conventional and nuclear deterrent ensures that India does not achieve the status uncontested. Its true stature is reduced by Pakistan's truculence and constant negative propaganda. Nevertheless, Indians have managed their foreign policy well enough and the world recognises it, or at least pretends to, as being a great emerging power comparable to China. Its status, thanks to the western media, has recently risen sharply.

Pakistan's ruling establishment realises that Pakistan's stature has diminished. The reasons for this are varied: Pakistan is the epic-centre of the Islamic Revolution; it has many militant Islamic groups; whenever a terrorist is arrested anywhere, some connection with Pakistan is mentioned. Pakistan is also perceived as a volatile, unstable and unreliable state with nuclear weapons. Major world powers are volubly worried about the future of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Would they fall into the hands of Islamic extremists, given the growing influence of Taliban in many areas of Pakistan? The US has become wary in its ties with Pakistan because of the threat of it being ruled by Taliban-like militants eventually.

Pakistan president claims standing for a moderate and modern Islam. But his regime's actions negate modernism and tolerance. The whole county is racked by sectarian terrorism. Jihadi organisations want to liberate Kashmir and the regime is still facing near revolt in FATA areas and Balochistan. The rhetoric of the ruling party is vaguely about Islam. This distance between reality and claims alarms foreigners. Nuclear weapons have aggravated great powers' concerns. Qazi Hussain Ahmed has claimed that the Americans have already taken control of these weapons. True or false, the suspicion of American intentions vis-a-vis Pakistan's nuclear weapons is widespread. The question is what should Pakistan do about, or with, these weapons?

There was the threat of an Indian invasion in 2002 during which Pakistan threatened the use of nukes a dozen times to make India desist. India had 600,000 troops on the border with armour. The world took this threat of war seriously. The fact is that Pakistan's atomic weapons had not deterred India. Why didn't they deter? It is simple. India too has many more nuclear weapons and vehicles to deliver. If Pakistan's nuclear deterrent deters India, there is no reason why many more Indian nuclear weapons would not deter Pakistan.

Actually, India dared Pakistan to use its nukes first and wait for a massive riposte. Pakistanis, instead of worsening the situation, found discretion to be better than valour and decided to concede the main Indian demand: Pakistan should rein in jihadis. The Indians were not fools to then go to war. They got what they wanted: that Pakistan should not let its territory be used against India. The assurance was credible. One's conclusion is that the nuclear weapons of Pakistan did not deter India from invading it. What happened was that Pakistan gave India what it demanded. The nukes proved useless in deterring India from demanding and getting the desired promise.

This central fact should guide Pakistan's policy makers. No more wars with India should be the aim. Islamabad has to follow a policy of peace, whether or not India responds likewise. Pakistan has to persevere. This is now a given. If this is so, a whole new policy orientation towards India is needed. This new India policy would be hindered by the presence of nukes, being a cold war baggage.

The best course will be to ask Muhammad al Baradei, the IAEA chief, to come and take charge of these weapons. Let his scientists dismantle them in a scientific manner into elements that can be used or disposed off safely. Doubtless, the world faces a problem: fissile material cannot safely be disposed off. But that is a different subject for scientists to tackle. Islamabad had better sign the NPT, CTBT and all the rest of the protocols. It should become a wholly non-nuclear power. That would lift the nightmare of India using its nuclear arsenals to decimate the urban-industrial centres of Pakistan. The threat of a possible conventional war would remain. But that will be faced best with policies of peace, more democracy, more trade and more popular contacts.

The matter does not end here. The nuclearisation of South Asia has meant huge distortions in the economies of both India and Pakistan. Far too many resources are being devoted to useless militarisation. Insofar as India is doing it, well that has to be deprecated. But Pakistanis should desist from doing what the Indians are doing so as not to remain entrapped in an arms race. Pakistan must eschew militarism.

Indians pose no existential threat to Pakistan. One holds that India is now far too Hinduised to think of annexing even a village of Pakistan. It simply has no use for Pakistani Muslims. India would say fine things for diplomatic purposes and be a good enough foreign power, if Pakistanis would allow it. But it would remain a foreign power. It would not now do what Nehru implied with his policy of more popular contacts. Nehru is dead and India has got rid of much of his legacy. India is now a different kettle of fish.

Pakistan has to adjust and evolve new policies regarding its nuclear weapons. Nukes are bad for the world and are even worse for South Asia. Pakistanis should revert to their earlier stance of wanting to make South Asia a nuclear weapons-free zone. Islamabad would acquire a high moral stature, a la South Africa, and its words would resonate. Pakistanis should be leading the world nuclear disarmament movement. Arguments have long been clear against a nuclear apartheid in which some possess nuclear weapons and boss over others on that basis. Pakistanis should be an important part of world peace and anti-nuclear movements. Some Indians are also campaigning against nuclearisation of South Asia. Pakistanis should join hands with them and strengthen the common movement.

The writer is a veteran journalist and freelance columnist. This article was published earlier in The News, Pakistan.
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